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Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains
with structured preferences
Je´roˆme Lang
Abstract
In many real-world collective decision problems, the set of alternatives is a Carte-
sian product of finite value domains for each of a given set of variables. The pro-
hibitive size of such combinatorial domains makes it practically impossible to rep-
resent preference relations explicitly. Now, the AI community has been developing
languages for representing preferences on such domains in a succinct way, exploiting
structural properties such as conditional preferential independence. In this paper we
reconsider voting and aggregation rules in the case where voters’ preferences have a
common preferential independence structure, and address the issue of decomposing
a voting rule or an aggregation function following a linear order over variables.
Key words : vote, combinatorial domains, compact preference representation
1 Introduction
Researchers in social choice have extensively studied the properties of voting rules and
aggregation functions, up to an important detail: candidates are supposed to be listed
explicitly (typically, they are individuals or lists of individuals), which assumes that they
are not too numerous. In this paper, we consider the case where the set of candidates has
a combinatorial structure, i.e., is a Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of
a finite set of variables.
Since the number of possible alternatives is then exponential in the number of vari-
ables, it is not reasonable to ask voters to rank all alternatives explicitly. Consider for
example that voters have to agree on a common menu to be composed of a first course,
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a main course, a dessert and a wine, with a choice of 6 items for each. This makes 64
candidates. This would not be a problem if each of the four items to be chosen were inde-
pendent from the other ones: in this case, this vote over a set of 64 candidates would come
down to four independent votes over sets of 6 candidates each, and any standard voting
rule could be applied without difficulty. Things become more complicated if voters ex-
press dependencies between items, such as “if the main course is meat then I prefer red
wine, otherwise I prefer white wine”. Indeed, as soon as variables are not preferentially
independent, it is generally a bad idea to decompose a vote problem with p variables into
a set of p smaller problems, each one bearing on a single variable: “multiple election para-
doxes” [5] show that such a decomposition leads to suboptimal choices, and give real-life
examples of such paradoxes, including simultaneous referenda on related issues. They ar-
gue that the only way of avoiding the paradox would consist in “voting for combinations
[of values]”, but they stress its practical difficulty without giving any hint for a practical
solution.
Because the preference structure of each voter in such a case cannot reasonably be
expressed by listing all candidates, what is needed is a compact preference representation
language. Such preference representation languages have been developed within the Ar-
tificial Intelligence community so as to escape the combinatorial blow up of the explicit
representation. Such languages allow a much more succinct representation than explicit
representations. Many of these languages (including CP-nets and their extensions) are
graphical: preferences are expressed locally (on small subsets of variables). The common
feature of these languages is that they allow for a concise representation of the preference
structure, while preserving a good readability (and hence a proximity with the way agents
express their preferences in natural language).
Thus, AI gives a first answer to the problem pointed in [5]. However, another problem
then arises: once preferences have been elicited, and represented in some compact rep-
resentation language, how is the voting or aggregation rule computed? The prohibitive
number of candidates makes it practically impossible to compute these rules in a straight-
forward way.
When domains are not too large, it may still be reasonable to first generate the whole
preference relations from their compact representations and then compute the outcome by
a direct implementation of the voting rule. However, when domains become bigger, this
naive method becomes too greedy and then we need to find a more sophisticated way of
computing the outcome of the vote. Two methods come to mind: either (1) give up opti-
mality and compute an approximation of the voting or aggregation rule, or (2) assume that
the voters’ preferences enjoy specific structural properties that can be exploited so as de-
compose the problem into smaller, local subproblems. Here we address (2), and we focus
on a specific restriction of preference profiles where all voters have a preference rela-
tion enjoying conditional preferential independencies compatible with a common acyclic
graph G. After giving some background on preference relations over combinatorial do-
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mains and vote in Section 2, we introduce and study sequential voting rules in Section 3.
Section 4 then considers preference aggregation over combinatorial domains, and Section
5 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Preferences on combinatorial domains
Let V = {x1, . . . ,xp} be a set of variables. For each xi ∈ V , Di is the value domain
of xi. A variable vi is binary if Di = {xi, xi}. Note the difference between the variable
xi and the value xi. If X = {xi1 , . . . ,xim} ⊆ V , with i1 < . . . < ip, then DX denotes
Dxi1 × . . .×Dxim .
X = D1 × ... × Dp is the set of all alternatives, or candidates. Elements of X
are denoted by ~x, ~x′ etc. and represented by concatenating the values of the variables:
for instance, if V = {x1,x2,x3}, x1x2x3 assigns x1 to x1, x2 to x2 and x3 to x3. We
allow concatenations of vectors of values: for instance, let V = {x1,x2,x3,x4,x5},
Y = {x1, x2}, Z = {x3, x4}, ~y = x1x2, ~z = x3x4, then ~y.~z.x5 denotes the alternative
x1x2x3x4x5.
A (strict) preference relation on X is a strict order (an irreflexive, asymmetric and
transitive binary relation). A linear preference relation is a complete strict order, i.e., for
any ~x and ~y 6= ~x, either ~x ≻ ~y or ~y ≻ ~x holds. If R is a preference relation, we generally
note ~x ≻R ~x′ instead of R(~x, ~x′).
Let {X,Y, Z} be a partition of the set V of variables and ≻ a preference relation over
DV . X is (conditionally) preferentially independent of Y given Z (w.r.t. ≻) if and only if
for all ~x1, ~x2 ∈ DX , ~y1, ~y2 ∈ DY , ~z ∈ DZ ,
~x1.~y1.~z ≻ ~x2.~y1.~z iff ~x1.~y2.~z ≻ ~x2.~y2.~z
Unlike probabilistic independence, preferential independence is a directed notion: X
may be independent of Y given Z without Y being independent of X given Z.
A CP-net N [2] over V is a pair consisting of a directed graph G over V and a
collection of conditional preference tables CPT (xi) for each xi ∈ V . Each conditional
preference table CPT (xi) associates a total order0 ≻i~u with each instanciation ~u of xi’s
parents Pa(xi) = U . For instance, let V = {x,y, z}, all three being binary, and assume
that preference of a given agent over 2V can be defined by a CP-net whose structural
part is the directed acyclic graph G = {(x, y), (y, z), (x, z)}; this means that the agent’s
0More generally, the entries of conditional preference tables may contain partial orders over the domains
of the variables (see [2]), but we don’t need this here.
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preference over the values of x is unconditional, preference over the values of y (resp. z)
is fully determined given the value of x (resp. the values of x and y).
The conditional preference statements contained in these tables are written with the
usual notation, that is, x1x2 : x3 ≻ x3 means that when x1 is true and x2 is false then
x3 = x3 is preferred to x3 = x3. In this paper we make the classical assumption that G is
acyclic. A CP-net N induces a preference ranking on X : ~x ≻N ~y iff there is a sequence
of improving flips from ~y to ~x, where an improving flip is the flip of a single variable ~xi
“respecting” the preference table CPT (xi) (see [2]). Note that the preference relation
induced from a CP-net is generally not complete.
Let G be a directed graph over V , and ≻ a linear preference relation. ≻ is said to
be compatible with G iff for each x ∈ V , x is preferentially independent of V \ ({x} ∪
Par(x)) given Par(x). The following fact is obvious, but important:
Observation 1 A linear preference relation ≻ is compatible with G if and only if there
exists a CP-net N whose associated graph is G and such that ≻ extends ≻N .
Let G be an acyclic graph over V and letO = x1 > ... > xp be a linear order on V . G
is said to followO iff for every edge (xi,xj) in G we have i < j. A preference relation ≻
is said to followO iff it is compatible with some acyclic graph G followingO. Clearly,≻
follows O = x1 > ... > xp if and only if for all i < p, xi is preferentially independent of
{xi+1, ..., xp} given {x1, ..., xi−1} with respect to≻. If≻ followsO then the projection of
≻ on xi given (x1, . . . , xi−1) ∈ D1 × . . .×Di−1, denoted by ≻xi|x1=x1,...,xi−1=xi−1 , is the
preference relation on Di defined by: for all xi, x′i ∈ Di, xi ≻xi|x1=x1,...,xi−1=xi−1 x′i iff
x1...xi−1xixi+1...xp ≻ x1...xi−1x
′
ixi+1..xp holds for all (xi+1, . . . , xp) ∈ Di+1× . . .×Dp.
Due to the fact that ≻ follows O and that ≻ is a linear order, ≻xi|x1=x1,...,xi−1=xi−1 is
a well-defined linear order as well. Note also that if ≻ follows both O = x1 > ... > xp
and O′ = xσ(1) > ... > xσ(k−1) > xi(= xσ(k)) > ... > xσ(p), then ≻xi|x1=x1,...,xi−1=xi−1
and ≻xi|xσ(1)=xσ(1),...,xσ(k−1)=xσ(k−1) coincide. In other words, the local preference relation
on xi depends only on the values of the parents of xi in G: ≻xi|x1=x1,...,xi−1=xi−1 and
≻xi|xσ(1)=xσ(1),...,xσ(k−1)=xσ(k−1) both coincide with ≻xi|par(xi)=y, where Y = par(xi).
Lastly, for any acyclic graph G over V , we say that two linear preference relations
R1 and R2 are G-equivalent, denoted by R1 ∼G R2, if and only if R1 and R2 are
both compatible with G and for any x ∈ V , for any ~y, ~y′ ∈ Dom(par(x)) we have
R
x|par(x)=~y
1 = R
x|par(x)=~y′
2 .
Observation 2 For any linear preference relations R and R′, R ∼G R′ if and only if
there exists a CP-netN whose associated graph is G and such that R and R′ both extend
≻N .
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Example 1 Let V = {x,y, z}, all three being binary. and let R and R′ be the following
linear preference relations:
R : xyz ≻ xyz¯ ≻ xy¯z¯ ≻ xy¯z ≻ x¯yz¯ ≻ x¯y¯z¯ ≻ x¯yz ≻ x¯y¯z
R′ : xyz ≻ xyz¯ ≻ x¯yz¯ ≻ xy¯z¯ ≻ x¯yz ≻ x¯y¯z¯ ≻ xy¯z ≻ x¯y¯z
Let G the graph over V whose set of edges is {(x,y), (x, z)}. R and R′ are both compat-
ible with G. Moreover, R ∼G R′, since all local preference relations coincide: x ≻xR x¯
and x ≻xR′ x¯; z ≻
z|x=x,y=y
R z¯ and z ≻
z|x=x,y=y
R′ z¯; etc. The CP-net N such that R and R′
both extend ≻N is defined by the following local conditional preferences: x ≻ x¯; y ≻ y¯;
xy : z ≻ z¯; xy¯ : z¯ ≻ z; x¯y : z¯ ≻ z; x¯y¯ : z¯ ≻ z.
2.2 Voting rules and correspondences
LetA = {1, ..., N} be a finite set of voters and X a finite set of candidates. A (collective)
preference profile w.r.t. A and X is a collection of N individual preference relations over
X : P = (≻1, ..., ≻N ) = (P1, ..., PN ). Let PA,X set of all preference profiles for A and X .
A voting correspondence C : PA,X → 2X \ {∅} maps each preference profile P
of PA,X into a nonempty subset C(P ) of X . A voting rule r : PA,X → X maps each
preference profile P of PA,X into a single candidate r(P ). A rule can be obtained from a
correspondence by prioritization over candidates (for more details see [4]).
To give an example, consider the well-known family of positional scoring rules and
correspondences. A positional scoring correspondence is defined from a scoring vector,
that is, a vector ~s = (s1, . . . , sm) of integers such that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm and s1 > sm.
Let ranki(x) be the rank of x in≻i (1 if it is the favorite candidate for voter i, 2 if it is the
second favorite etc.). The score of x is defined by S(x) = ∑Ni=1 sranki(x). The candidates
chosen by the correspondence defined from ~s is the set of all candidates maximizing S. A
positional voting rule is defined as a positional scoring correspondence plus a tie-breaking
mechanism, for the case where more than one candidate have a maximum score. Well-
known examples are the Borda rule, given by sk = m − k for all k = 1, . . . ,m; the
plurality rule, by s1 = 1, and sk = 0 for all k > 1; and the veto rule, by sk = 1 for all
k < m, and sm = 0.
We also recall the definition of a Condorcet winner (CW). Given a profile P = (≻1,
..., ≻N ), x ∈ X is a Condorcet winner iff it is preferred to any other candidate by a strict
majority of voters, that is, for all y 6= x, #{i, x ≻i y} > N2 . It is well-known that there
are some profiles for which no CW exists. Obviously, when a CW exists then it is unique.
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3 Sequential voting
Given a combinatorial set of alternatives and a compact representation (in some prefer-
ence representation language R) of the voters’ preferences, how can we compute the (set
of) winner(s)? The naive way consisting in “unfolding” the compactly expressed prefer-
ence relations (that is, generating the whole preference relations on D1 × . . . ×Dp from
the input), and then applying a given voting rule, is obviously unfeasible, except if the
number of variables is really small. We can try to do better and design an algorithm for
applying a given voting rule r on a succinctly described profile P without generating the
preferences relations explicitly. However, we can’t be too optimistic, because it is known
that the latter problem is computationally hard, even for simple succinct representation
languages and simple rules (see [6]).
A way of escaping this problem consists in restricting the set of admissible prefer-
ence profiles in such a way that computationally simple voting rules can be applied1.
A very natural restriction (that we investigate in the next Section) consists in assuming
that preferences enjoy some specific structural properties such as conditional preferential
independencies.
3.1 Sequential voting rules and correspondences
Now comes the central assumption to the sequential approach: there exists an acyclic
graph G such that the preference relation of every voter is compatible with G. This as-
sumption is not as restrictive as it may appear at first look: suppose indeed that preference
relations (≻1, . . . ,≻N) are compatible with the acyclic graphs G1, . . . , GN , whose sets
of edges are E1, . . . , EN . Then they are a fortiori compatible with the graph G∗ whose
set of edges is E1 ∪ . . . ∪ EN . Therefore, if G∗ is acyclic, then sequential voting will
be applicable to (≻1, . . . ,≻N) (of course, this is no longer true if G∗ has cycles). More-
over, in many real-life domains it may be deemed reasonable to assume that preferential
dependencies between variables coincide for all agents.
Sequential voting consists then in applying “local” voting rules or correspondances on
single variables, one after the other, in such an order that the local vote on a given variable
can be performed only when the local votes on all its parents in the graph G have been
performed.
We define CompG as the set of all collective profiles P = (≻1, . . . ,≻N) such that
each ≻i is compatible with G.
1Such an assumption is called a “domain restriction” in social choice theory – here, the “domain” has to
be understood as the set of admissible preferences, not the set of alternatives.
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Definition 1 Let G be an acyclic graph on V ; let P = (P1, ..., PN ) in CompG,O = x1 >
... > xp a linear order on V following G, and (r1, . . . , rp) a collection of deterministic
voting rules (one for each variable xi). The sequential voting rule Seq(r1, . . . , rp) is
defined as follows:
• x∗1 = r1(P
x1
1 , . . . , P
x1
N );
• x∗2 = r2(P
x2|x1=x∗1
1 , . . . , P
x2|x1=x∗1
N );
• . . .
• x∗p = rp(P
xp|x1=x∗1,..,xp−1=x
∗
p−1
1 , .., P
xp|x1=x∗1,..,xp−1=x
∗
p−1
N )
Then Seq(r1, . . . , rp)(P ) = (x∗1, . . . , x∗p).
Example 2 Let N = 12, V = {x,y} with Dom(x) = {x, x¯} and Dom(y) = {y, y¯},
and P = 〈P1, . . . , P12〉 the following 12-voter profile:
P1, P2, P3, P4 : xy ≻ x¯y ≻ xy¯ ≻ x¯y¯
P5, P6, P7: xy¯ ≻ xy ≻ x¯y ≻ x¯y¯
P8, P9, P10: x¯y ≻ x¯y¯ ≻ xy ≻ xy¯
P10, P11: x¯y ≻ x¯y¯ ≻ xy¯ ≻ xy
All these preference relations are compatible with the graph G over {x,y} whose
single edge is (x,y); equivalently, they follow the order x > y. Hence, P ∈ CompG.
The corresponding conditional preference tables to are:
voters 1,2,3,4 voters 5,6,7 voters 8,9,10 voters 11,12
x ≻ x¯
x : y ≻ y¯
x¯ : y ≻ y¯
x ≻ x¯
x : y¯ ≻ y
x¯ : y ≻ y¯
x¯ ≻ x
x : y ≻ y¯
x¯ : y ≻ y¯
x¯ ≻ x
x : y¯ ≻ y
x¯ : y ≻ y¯
Take rx and ry both equal to the majority rule, together with a tie-breaking mechanism
which, in case of a tie between x and x¯ (resp. between y and y¯), elects x (resp. y). The
projection of P on x is composed of 7 votes for x and 5 for x¯, that is, P xi is equal to x ≻ x¯
for 1 ≤ i ≤ 7 and to x¯ ≻ x for 8 ≤ i ≤ 12. Therefore x∗ = rx(P x1 , . . . , P x12) = x: the
x-winner is x∗ = x. Now, the projection of P on y given x = x is composed of 7 votes for
y and 5 for y¯, therefore y∗ = y, and the sequential winner is now obtained by combining
the x–winner and the conditional y-winner given x = x∗ = x, namely Seqrx,ry(P ) = xy.
In addition to sequential voting rules, we also define sequential voting correspon-
dences in a similar way: if for each i,Ci is a correspondence onDi, then Seq(C1, . . . , Cp)(P )
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is the set of all outcomes (x1, . . . , xp) such that x1 ∈ C1(P x11 , . . . , P x1N ), and for all i ≥ 2,
xi ∈ Ci(P
xi|x1=x1,..,xi−1=xi−1
i , .., P
xi|x1=x1,..,xi−1=xi−1
N ). Due to the lack of space, we give
results for voting rules only.
An important property of such sequential voting rules and correspondences is that
the outcome does not depend on O, provided that G follows O. This can be expressed
formally:
Observation 3 Let O = (x1 > . . . > xp) and O′ = (xσ(1) > . . . > xσ(p)) be two linear
orders on V such that G follows both O and O′. Then
Seq(r1, . . . , rp)(P ) = Seq(rσ(1), . . . , rσ(p))(P )
and similarly for voting correspondences.
Note that when all variables are binary, all “reasonable” neutral voting rules (we have
no space to comment on what “reasonable” means – and this has been debated extensively
in the social choice literature) coincide with the majority rule when the number of candi-
dates is 2 (plus a tie-breaking mechanism). Therefore, if all variables are binary and the
number of voters is odd (in which case the tie-breaking mechanism is irrelevant), then the
only “reasonable” sequential voting rule is Seq(r1, . . . , rn) where each ri is the majority
rule.
It is important to remark that, in order to compute Seq(r1, . . . , rp)(P ), we do not
need to know the preference relations P1, . . . , PN entirely: everything we need is the local
preference relations: for instance, if V = {x,y} andG contains the only edge (x,y), then
we need first the unconditional preference relations on x and then the preference relations
on y conditioned by the value of x. In other words, if we know the conditional preference
tables (for all voters) associated with the graph G, then we have enough information
to determine the sequential winner for this profile, even though some of the preference
relations induced from these tables are incomplete. This is expressed more formally by
the following fact (a similar result holds for correspondences):
Observation 4 Let V = {x1, . . . ,xp},G an acyclic graph over V , and P = (P1, . . . , PN),
P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P
′
N) two complete preference profiles such that for all i = 1, . . . , N we
have Pi ∼G P ′i . Then, for any collection of local voting rules (r1, . . . , rp), we have
Seq(r1, . . . , rp)(P ) = Seq(r1, . . . , rp)(P
′).
This, together with Observation 2, means that applying sequential voting to two col-
lections of linear preference relations corresponding to the same collection of CP-nets
gives the same result. This is illustrated on the following example.
Example 3 Everything is as in Example 2, except that we don’t know the voters’ complete
preference relations, but only their corresponding conditional preference tables. These
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conditional preferences contain strictly less information than P , because some of the
preference relations they induce are not complete: for instance, the induced preference
relation for the first 4 voters is xy ≻ x¯y ≻ x¯y¯, xy ≻ xy¯ ≻ x¯y¯, with xy¯ and x¯y being
incomparable. However, we have enough information to determine the sequential winner
for this profile, even though some of the preference relations are incomplete. For instance,
taking again the majority rule for rx and ry, the sequential winner is xy for any complete
profile P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P ′12) extending the incomplete preference relations induced by the
12 conditional preference tables above.
3.2 Sequential decomposability
We now consider the following question: given a voting rule r, is there a way of comput-
ing r sequentially when the preference relations enjoy common preferential independen-
cies?
Definition 2 A voting rule r on X = D1× . . .×Dp is decomposable if and only if there
exist n voting rules r1, . . . , rp on D1, . . . , Dp such that for any linear order O = x1 >
... > xp on V and for any preference profile P = (P1, ..., PN ) such that each Pi follows
O, we have Seq(r1, . . . , rp)(P ) = r(P ). The definition is similar for correspondences.
An interesting question is the following: for which voting rules r does the sequential
winner (obtained by sequential applications of r) and the “direct” winner (obtained by a
direct application of r) coincide? The following result shows that this fails for the the
whole family of scoring rules (and similarly for correspondances).
Proposition 1 No positional scoring rule is decomposable.
Proof sketch: We give a proof sketch for the case of two binary variables (this generalizes eas-
ily to more variables, as well as to non-binary variables). Let r be a decomposable scoring rule
on 2{x,y}: there exist two local rules rx and ry such that whenever P follow x > y, we have
Seq(rx, ry)(P ) = r(P ). Then we show that rx and ry are both the majority rule (this follows
easily from the fact that some properties of r, including monotonicity, carry on to rx and ry.) Now,
consider the same preference profile P as in Example 3. P follows the order x > y. Now, let
s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3 ≥ s4 = 0 (with s1 > 0) the weights defining r. The score of xy is 4s1 + 3s2 + 3s3;
the score of x¯y is 5s1 +4s2 +3s3, which is strictly larger than the score of xy, therefore xy cannot
be the winner for r, whatever the values of s1, s2, s3. ¥
Such counterexamples can be found for many usual voting rules outside the family
of scoring rules (we must omit the results due to the lack of space), including the whole
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family of voting rules based on the majority graph. Positive results, on the other hand,
seem very hard to get. Obviously, dictatorial rules (electing the preferred candidate of
some fixed voter) and constant rules (electing a fixed candidate whatever the voters’ pref-
erences) are decomposable. But the latter rules are of course not reasonable, and we
conjecture that the answer to the above question is negative as soon as a few reasonable
properties are required2.
A particular case of preferential independence is when all variables are preferen-
tially independent from each other, which corresponds to a dependency graph G with no
edges. In this case, the preference profile follows any order on the set of variables, and
the sequential winner is better called a parallel winner, since the local votes on the single
variables can be performed in any order. We might then consider the following property
of separability:
Definition 3 A deterministic rule r is separable if and only if for any preference profile P
= (≻1, ..., ≻N ) such that the variables are pairwise conditionally preferentially indepen-
dent, the parallel winner of r w.r.t. P is equal to r(P ).
Obviously, any decomposable rule is separable. Are there any separable rules? Fo-
cusing on positional scoring rules, we find a rather intriguing result (the proof of which is
omitted):
Proposition 2 Let V = {x1, . . . ,xp} (with p ≥ 2).
• if p = 2 and both variables are binary, exactly one positional scoring rule is sepa-
rable: the rule associated with the weights s1 = 2s2 = 2s3 (and s4 = 0).
• in all other cases (p ≥ 3 or at least one variable has more than 2 possible values),
then no positional scoring rule is separable.
3.3 Sequential Condorcet winners
We may now wonder whether a Condorcet winner (CW), when there exists one, can be
computed sequentially. Sequential Condorcet winners (SCW) are defined similarly as for
sequential winners for a given rule: the SCW is the sequential combination of “local”
Condorcet winners.
2More precisely, it could be the case that the only correspondence satisfying anonymity, neutrality and
decomposability is the correspondence such that C(P ) = X for all P . We spent a lot of time trying to
prove such an impossibility theorem, without success.
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Definition 4 Let G be an acyclic graph and P = (≻1, ..., ≻N ) a profile in CompG. LetO
= x1 > ... > xp be a linear order on V following G. (x∗1, . . . , x∗p) is a sequential Condorcet
winner for P if and only if
• ∀x′1 ∈ D1, #{i, x
∗
1 ≻
x1
i x
′
1} >
N
2
;
• for every k > 1 and ∀x′k ∈ Dk,
#{i, x∗k ≻
xk|x1=x
∗
1
,...,xk−1=x
∗
k−1
i x
′
k} >
N
2
.
This definition is well-founded because we obtain the same set of SCWs for any O
following G. The question is now, do SCWs and CWs coincide? Clearly, the existence
of a SCW is no more guaranteed than that of a CW, and there cannot be more than one
SCW. We have the following positive result:
Proposition 3 LetG be an acyclic graph and P = (≻1, ...,≻N ) inCompG. If (x∗1, x∗2, . . . , x∗n)
is a Condorcet winner for P , then it is a sequential Condorcet winner for P .
Proof sketch: Let > be an order on V following G. Assume there is a CW ~x∗ for P : for any
~x′ 6= ~x∗, #{i, ~x∗ ≻i ~x
′} > N2 . Let x1 ∈ D1 s.t. x
′
1 6= x
∗
1. Since x1 is preferentially independent
of x2, . . . ,xp, x∗1 ≻
x1
i x
′
1 iff (x∗1, x∗2, . . . x∗p) ≻i (x′1, x∗2, . . . x∗p); hence, #{i, x∗1 ≻
x1
i x
′
1} >
N
2 :
x∗1 is a “local” CW. Similarly, for all k, by comparing ~x∗ to (x∗1, . . . , x∗k−1, x′k, x∗k+1, . . . , x∗p), we
show that x∗k is a “local” CW for (≻
xk|x1=x
∗
1
,...,xk−1=x
∗
k−1
i )i=1,...,N . ¥
The following example shows that the converse fails: 2 voters have the preference
relation xy¯ ≻ x¯y¯ ≻ xy ≻ x¯y, one voter xy ≻ xy¯ ≻ x¯y ≻ x¯y¯, and 2 voters x¯y ≻ x¯y¯ ≻
xy ≻ xy¯. x and y are mutually preferentially independent in all relations, therefore the
SCW is the combination of the locals CW for {x} and for {y}, provided they exist. Since
3 voters unconditionally prefer x to x¯, x is the {x}-CW; similarly, 3 voters unconditionally
prefer y to y¯ and is the {y}-CW. Therefore, xy is the SCW for the given profile; but xy is
not a CW for this profile, because 4 voters prefer x¯y¯ to xy.
We now give a condition on the preference relations ensuring that SCWs and CWs
coincide. Let O = x1 ⊲ . . . ⊲ xp be a linear order on V . We say that a preference
relation ≻ on DX is conditionally lexicographic w.r.t. O if there exist p local conditional
preference relations ≻xi|x1=x1,...,xi−1=xi−1 x′i for i = 1, .., p, such that ~x ≻ ~y if and only
if there is a j ≤ p such that (a) for every k < j, xk = yk and (b) xj ≻xj |x1=x1,...,xj−1=xj−1
yj . A profile P = (≻1, . . . ,≻N) is conditionally lexicographic w.r.t. O if each ≻i is
conditionally lexicographic w.r.t. O. Such preference relations can be represented by
TCP-nets [3] or conditional preference theories [8].
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Proposition 4 Let O be a linear strict order over V . If P = (≻1, . . . ,≻N) is condition-
ally lexicographic w.r.t. O, then ~x is a sequential Condorcet winner for P if and only if it
is a Condorcet winner for P .
Proof sketch: Let ~x∗ a SCW for P , and ~x′ 6= ~x∗. Let k = min{i, x∗i 6= x′i} and Ik ⊆ A be
the set of voters who prefer x∗k to x′k given x1 = x1, . . . ,xk−1 = xk−1. Because ~x∗ is a SCW,
|Ik| >
N
2 . We have ~x
∗ ≻i ~x
′ for every i ∈ Ik, because ≻i is lexicographic w.r.t. x1 ⊲ . . . ⊲ xp.
Therefore a majority of voters prefers ~x∗ to ~x′. This being true for all ~x′ 6= ~x∗, ~x∗ is a CW. ¥
4 Arrow’s theorem and structured domains
We end this paper by considering decomposable domains from the point of view of pref-
erence aggregation. A preference aggregation function maps a profile to an aggregated
profile representing the preference of the group. Arrow’s theorem [1] states that any
aggregation function defined on the set of all profiles and satisfying unanimity and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIR) is dictatorial. An Arrow-consistent domain D is
a subset of P allowing for unanimous, IIR and nondictatorial aggregation functions.
It is easy to see that for any acyclic graph G, Comp(G) is an Arrow-consistent. In-
deed, consider the preference aggregation function defined as follows:
• reorder the variables in an order compatible with G, i.e., w.l.o.g., assume that there
is no edge (xi,xj) in G with i ≥ j. Such an order exists because G is acyclic.
• let h : V → A associating a voter to each variable, such that h is not constant (it is
possible because |V| ≥ 2).
• for any ~x and ~y 6= ~x, let k(~x, ~y) = min{j, xj 6= yj}.
• for any collective profile 〈≻1, . . . ,≻N〉, define ≻∗= fh(≻1, . . . ,≻N) by: for all ~x
and ~y, ~x ≻∗ ~y if xk ≻xk|x1=x1,...,xn=xnh(k) yk, where k = k(~x, ~y).
Proposition 5 fh is a nondictatorial aggregation function on Comp(G) satisfying una-
nimity and IIR.
Therefore, Comp(G) is Arrow-consistent. fh is easier to understand when it is turned
into a voting rule: voter h(x1) first chooses his preferred value for variable x1, then voter
h(x2) comes into play and chooses his preferred value for variable x2 given the value
assigned to x1, and so forth.
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Now, even if fh is truly nondictatorial, it however has p local dictators (one for each
variable), since voter h(i) imposes his preference on the domain of xi We may then won-
der whether a weaker form of Arrow’s theorem holds for Comp(G). This is actually the
case. Let us first express the following properties (P1), (P2), (P3).
(P1) preservation of the independence structure
f is a mapping from Comp(G)N to Comp(G).
(P2) independence of irrelevant values and variables
For any xi ∈ V , ~z ∈ DPar(xi), and P = 〈P1, . . . , PN〉, Q = 〈Q1, . . . , QN〉 in
Comp(G)N such that for every j and all x, x′ ∈ Dxi , x ≻
xi|~z
Pj
x′ iff x ≻xi|~zQj x
′
, we
have
x ≻
xi|~z
f(P ) x
′ if and only if x ≻xi|~zf(Q) x′.
(P3) local unanimity
For any P ∈ Comp(G), xi ∈ V and ~z ∈ DPar(xi), if P
xi|~z
1 = . . . = P
xi|~z
N then
f(P )xi|~z = P
xi|~z
1 .
(P1) expresses that the preferential independencies expressed in the graph G should
be transferred to the aggregated preference relation. Therefore, under (P1), for any pref-
erence relation≻∗ resulting from the aggregation of N preferences relations in Comp(G)
there exist p local conditional preference relations ≻xi|Par(xi)∗ , for i = 1, . . . , p.
(P2) is a local version of independence of irrelevant alternatives: whether the society
prefers a value xi to another value yi of xi given an assignment ~z of the parent variables
of xi depends only on the voters’ preferences between these two values given ~z (and not
on their preferences on other values of xi nor on their preferences on other variables.)
(P3) tells that if all voters have the same local preference relation over the values of a
variable xi given a fixed value ~z of its parents, then the local collective preference on Dxi
given ~z should be equal to this local preference relation.
Importantly, note that the way (P2) and (P3) are written depends on the assumption
that (P1) holds – otherwise we would not have been allowed to write ≻xi|~zf(P ).
Proposition 6 Let G be an acyclic graph G over a set of variables V = {x1, . . . ,xp}
with domains D1, . . . , Dp such that for every i, |Di| ≥ 3. An aggregation function f on
Comp(G) satisfies (P1), (P2) and (P3) if and only if there exists a local dictator d(xi, ~z)
for each variable xi and each ~z ∈ DPar(xi), such that for each ~t ∈ DV \(Par(xi)∪{xi}), we
have
~z~txi ≻f(≻1,...,≻N ) ~z~tx
′
i ⇔ ~z~txi ≻d(xi,~z) ~z~tx
′
i.
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Proof sketch: The⇐ direction is straightforward. For the⇒ direction, let f satisfying (P1), (P2)
and (P3). (P1) guarantees that for every xi and ~z ∈ DPar(xi), xi is independent of V \(DPar(xi)∪
{xi}) given ~z, therefore there exists a well-defined, local collective preference relation ≻xi|~z∗ such
that for all ~t ∈ DV \(Par(xi) ∪ {xi}) and for all xi, x′i ∈ Dxi , ~z~txi ≻∗ ~z~tx′i. (P2) implies that
≻
xi|~z
∗ is fully determined by the voters’ preferences on the values of xi given ~z. Therefore, there
exists a local aggregation function fxi|~z such that ≻xi|~z∗ = fxi|~z(≻xi|~z1 , . . . ,≻
xi|~z
N ). It remains to
be shown that these local aggregation functions satisfy the conditions of Arrow’ theorem, which
does not present any particular difficulty. Applying then Arrow’s theorem to each local aggrega-
tion function fxi|~z enables us to conclude to the existence of a dictator d(xi, ~z) for each variable
xi and each ~z ∈ DPar(xi), such that xi ≻fxi|~z(≻xi|~z
1
,...,≻
xi|~z
N
)
x′i ⇔ xi ≻
xi|~z
d(xi,~z)
x′i. Now, the
fact that ≻xi|~z∗ = fxi|~z(≻xi|~z1 , . . . ,≻
xi|~z
N ) allows us to conclude that xi ≻
xi|~z
d(xi,~z)
x′i is equivalent
to xi ≻
xi|~z
f(≻1,...,≻N )
x′i , which in turn is equivalent to: for all ~t ∈ DV \(Par(xi)∪{xi}) and for all
xi, x
′
i ∈ Dxi , ~z~txi ≻∗ ~z~tx
′
i, where ≻∗= f(≻1, . . . ,≻N ). ¥
Note that the local dictator for a given variable may depend on the values of its parents.
For instance, with two variables x and y and a dependency graph with the edge (x,y),
we have a single dictator for xi and up to |Dx| dictators for y.
Corollary 1 Let Sep(V ) be the domain of fully separable prefence relations on DV . An
aggregation function f on Sep(V ) satisfies (P1), (P2) and (P3) iff there exists p local
dictators d(xi), . . . , d(xp) such that for each ~t ∈ DV \{xi},
~txi ≻f(≻1,...,≻N ) ~tx
′
i ⇔ ~txi ≻d(xi) ~tx
′
i.
Finally, note that knowing the local dictators does not fully determine f . Suppose for
instance that we have two voters and two binary variables x and y, and that G has no
edge. Assume voter 1 prefers x to x¯ and voter 2 prefers y to y¯. Then ≻∗= f(≻1,≻2) is
such that x ≻~x∗ x¯ and y ≻~y∗ y¯, but this does not tell whether xy¯ ≻∗ x¯y or x¯y ≻∗ xy¯.
5 Conclusion
As far as we know, aggregating structured preferences on combinatorial domains ex-
ploiting preferential independence properties has never been considered neither in social
choice nor in AI. [7] define a multi-agent extension to CP-nets and propose various se-
mantics for aggregating preferences; but they do not address computational issues.
This paper contains several negative results. But one important question is left unan-
swered: what are the sequentially decomposable voting rules? Answering this question
(by finding a small set of properties implying that a rule cannot be decomposable) seems
much more difficult than we thought, and this is of course an issue for further research.
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Next, we identified a domain for which direct and sequential Condorcet winners co-
incide. Clearly, lexicographic preferences are very specific, so that we would like to find
more reasonable restrictions for the latter property to hold.
Another important issue stems from the fact that in combinatorial domains with struc-
tural properties (independencies), direct (global) voting rules are generally not computable
by a sequential application of local rules: so, what should we favor? Global voting rules,
which are well studied in social choice but which take no advantage of preferential inde-
pendencies, or sequential local rules, which are based on the dependency graph, thereby
being more intuitive and easier to compute? A theoretical comparison between global
voting and sequential local voting is a highly promising issue.
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